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Al-Risāla al-Shamsīya fī l-qawāʿid al-manṭiqīya by Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 1277) is one of the 
most widely-read textbooks on logic ever written. Its %rst readers, however, were less 
enthusiastic about it than later generations proved to be. In the earliest commentary 
written on the Shamsīya, al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 1325) expressed serious reservations about a 
number of Kātibī’s decisions, decisions which developed ideas %rst put forward by Fakhr al-
Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210). In the following article, I examine how the commentary Ḥillī wrote on 
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Bdaiwi for kindly casting an eye over a study written about Ḥillī by a dyed-in-the-wool Rāzian. Much of the 
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happy to record once again my deep gratitude to the funding bodies.
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the Shamsīya, al-Qawāʿid al-jalīya fī sharḥ al-Risāla al-Shamsīya, %ts in with his other works on 
logic, and how it responds to Kātibī’s logical program in general and to the syllogistic in 
particular. When set against the preceding two centuries of commentary on Avicenna’s 
Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt, Ḥillī’s response to the Shamsīya — and indeed Kātibī’s writing 
of the Shamsīya itself — can be seen as seamlessly carrying forward a commentary tradition 
in which Rāzī and and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) %gure prominently. The %rst appendix 
to the article examines the transformation of a lemma in the Ishārāt into the corresponding
lemma in the Shamsīya through 150 years of commentatorial debate; the second appendix 
presents translations of a number of texts on syllogistic from al-Qawāʿid al-jalīya.
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Some time in the 1270s, probably in Marāgha, Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, 
generally known as al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī  (d. 1325), produced the 'rst in a long line of 
commentaries on a short logic textbook by Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 1277). The textbook, al-
Risāla al-Shamsīya fī l-qawāʿid al-manṭiqīya (The Epistle for Shams al-Dīn on the Rules of Logic, 
henceforth Shamsīya),1 was to go on to achieve staggering success: by the mid-fourteenth 
century it had become the standard text for teaching logic throughout the realms of Islam. 
Of the crowd of commentaries and super-commentaries written on the Shamsīya since 
Ḥillī’s 'rst e(ort, it is above all the one written by his student, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-
Taḥtānī (d. 1365), Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqīya fī sharḥ al-Risāla al-Shamsīya (Redaction of the 
Rules of Logic in Commentary on the Epistle for Shams al-Dīn, henceforth Taḥrīr),2 that came to be
the commentary most often consulted by later generations of logic teachers. But Ḥillī’s al-
Qawāʿid al-jalīya fī sharḥ al-Risāla al-Shamsīya (Clear Rules in Commentary on the Epistle for Shams 
al-Dīn, henceforth Qawāʿid)3 was far from superseded by Taḥtānī’s Taḥrīr, and — as I hope to 
show — has much to o(er the historian of Arabic logic.
It is doubtful that Ḥillī would have been pleased with the Shamsīya’s ultimate success, not at
any rate when he was a young man writing his commentary on it. He saw it as infected with
the incorrect logical doctrines common among those he referred to as the followers of 
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210); in his commentary he *agged for his readers what he thought
were the most pernicious of these incorrect doctrines. As will become clear, Ḥillī was 
1. Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī, al-Risāla al-Shamsīya fī l-qawāʿid al-manṭiqīya. Given as lemmata in al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, al-
Qawāʿid al-jalīya fī sharḥ al-Risāla al-Shamsīya, ed. Fāris Tabrīziyān (Qum 2012).
2. Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Quṭb al-Dīn al-Taḥtānī, Taḥrīr al-qawāʿid al-manṭiqīyah fī sharḥ al-Risālah al-
Shamsīyah (ed. Cairo 1948); contains both the Shamsīya and the Taḥrīr.
3. al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, al-Qawāʿid al-jalīya fī sharḥ al-Risāla al-Shamsīya, ed. by Fāris Tabrīziyān (Qum 2012).
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hoping to compel upon his readers a pre-Rāzian vision of the discipline. But for all his 
instinctive resistance to the Shamsīya, Ḥillī was a restrained and helpful commentator. To 
the extent that I can claim to understand what Kātibī is doing in the Shamsīya, I have been 
guided more by Ḥillī than by anyone else.
There are, then, two good reasons to study Ḥillī’s Qawāʿid aside from its exemplary clarity in
explaining Kātibī’s compressed exposition in the Shamsīya. First, it provides details of an 
important substantive point at issue between those who worked with the logical insights of 
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and those who rejected them, above all, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) 
and the young Ḥillī himself. Secondly — and especially when it is set in the context of 
immediately preceding logical debates —, it provides us with an interesting perspective on 
the dynamics of the post-Avicennan tradition of philosophical commentary in the late 
thirteenth century. 
What follows is a short paper with two fairly lengthy appendices. I have written it in this 
way because the main points I hope to make are few in number and simple to outline. That 
said, they lie hidden in the texts behind a thicket of technical detail. I would be sad if that 
technicality drove away those who are interested in matters to do with Ḥillī’s output and 
intellectual development, or in broader questions to do with post-Avicennan commentary. I
have therefore tried to quarantine the parts of the study which deal with these matters so 
that the reader will not have to wade through the rebarbative terms of syllogistic art to 
follow the storyline. For that hardy band who are only really happy knee-deep in the 
aforementioned technicalities, however, the appendices should provide some joy. The 'rst 
appendix charts the development from Avicenna’s way of reading the subject term of a 
modal proposition to the readings which bothered Ḥillī so much; this is perhaps the most 
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important single substantive development which determined the transformation of the 
logic section of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt (The Book of Pointers and Reminders; 
henceforth Ishārāt)4 into the Shamsīya. The second appendix presents translations of 
passages from Ḥillī in which he set out his position on the central problem he disputed with
the Rāzians; read alongside the texts in the 'rst appendix, they show how continuous 
commentaries on the Ishārāt are with, 'rst, the formulation of cardinal passages in the 
Shamsīya and, secondly, the commentaries determining the early reception of the Shamsīya. 
These translations are also meant to serve as a contribution to the growing dossier of post-
Avicennan discussion of the modal syllogistic. 
ḤILLĪ’S WORK ON LOGIC
Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī was born in 1250 to a scholarly family of Imāmī Shiʿites in Ḥilla.5 He met 
Ṭūsī while still a child, and probably — though this is disputed — went to Marāgha to study 
with him in the late 1260s or the 1270s. Once there, he also studied with Kātibī. In fact, we 
may speculate that Ḥillī got most of his formal education in logic from Kātibī, reading as he 
did not only Kātibī’s own works but also Kātibī’s commentaries on what were to become 
classic texts by Rāzī and Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī (d. 1248). It is likely that he also studied 
4. Avicenna, Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt, given as lemmata in Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Ḥall mushkilāt al-Ishārāt, 2nd
ed. by Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1971).
5. Much in this section depends on Sabine Schmidtke, The Theology of al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325) (Berlin: 
Klaus Schwartz, 1991). I draw, speci'cally, on pages 17‒19 and 56‒61; where other sources are used, I note 
them in the footnotes. For the reasons given, I tend to date the Qawāʿid slightly earlier than Schmidtke does, 
al-Jawhar al-naḍīd fī sharḥ kitāb al-tajrīd (full reference in footnote 10 below) slightly later. For a more compact 
presentation of the bio-bibliographical material, see Sabine Schmidtke, Encyclopaedia Iranica, s.v. Ḥelli, Ḥasan 
b. Yusof b. Moṭahhar, accessed July 22nd, 2016: http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/helli-hasan-b-yusof-b-
motahhar
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logic with Ṭūsī, presumably by way of reading Ḥall mushkilāt al-Ishārāt (Solution to the 
Problems of Pointers; henceforth Ḥall)6 under his direction. It was the period of study under 
Ṭūsī which — as will become evident — determined his early views on the discipline. Ḥillī, 
in short, had studied with two of the greatest logicians of his time.
Ḥillī was the 'rst person to write a commentary on the Shamsīya, so the Qawāʿid is our main 
source for understanding the early reception history of the Shamsīya. The earliest 
manuscript of the Qawāʿid dates to 1280. It’s important to note that 1280 is when the 
manuscript was transcribed (furigha min naskhihā),7 not when the work was 'nished, and — 
pace Schmidtke — I tend to think the Qawāʿid was written before 1277. I haven’t found any 
passage of the commentary in which Ḥillī pays pious respects for Kātibī, who would have 
been three years dead at the execution of the manuscript. I think it unlikely that Ḥillī would
have failed to show Kātibī the respect of the usual formulas, although I recognise that it is 
possible that sectarian considerations came into play, and kept Ḥillī silent at the mention of
a Sunnī teacher.8
Although the Qawāʿid is the work of a man in his mid-twenties, it may not be Ḥillī’s 'rst 
work on logic. That honour perhaps belongs to the section he devoted to logic in al-Asrār al-
khafīya fī l-ʿulūm al-ʿaqlīya (Hidden Secrets in the Intellectual Sciences; henceforth Asrār);9 the 
6. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Ḥall mushkilāt al-Ishārāt, 2nd ed. by Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1971).
7. Qawāʿid 415.pu; I acknowledge that naskh is equivocal, but I read it here as “transcription.”
8. It would seem that polemics don’t 'gure prominently in Ḥillī’s work (though arguments from near silence 
are dangerous); see Tariq Al-Jamil, “Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī: Shiʿi Polemics and the 
Struggle for Religious Authority in Medieval Islam,” in Ibn Taymiyya and His Times, edited by Youssef Rapoport 
and Shahab Ahmed (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), at 232.
9. al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, al-Asrār al-khafīya fī l-ʿulūm al-ʿaqlīya (ed. Qum 2000).
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section comes to over 200 pages in the Qum edition. Readers of the Qawāʿid are advised in 
its concluding passage to refer to the Asrār for a full treatment of all the objectionable 
doctrines advanced by Kātibī, so it is quite possible that Ḥillī had written it before 1277. It is
however also possible, extrapolating from the writing practice of other scholars of the time,
that Ḥillī was writing the two texts at once, or even merely planning the Asrār as he was 
writing the Qawāʿid. In any event, it is the Asrār where we 'nd a full account of his own 
early views on logic along with a critique of Kātibī’s doctrines. The reader could come away 
from the Qawāʿid thinking that Ḥillī was troubled by only a few things in the Shamsīya; the 
Asrār completely dispels that impression.
Ḥillī’s commentary on Ṭūsī’s Tajrīd al-manṭiq (Abstract of Logic), al-Jawhar al-naḍīd fī sharḥ 
Kitāb al-Tajrīd (The Faceted Jewel in Commentary on the Book of Abstraction; henceforth Jawhar)10 
is a somewhat later work which Schmidtke dates relatively early, to shortly after 1280. It 
seems to me that Ḥillī in the Jawhar is less full-throated in his support for Ṭūsī’s positions 
than he is in the Asrār. So the modal inferences passionately defended in the Qawāʿid and 
the Asrār (for example, that a syllogism is productive with a possibility proposition as 
minor premise; see Appendix 2, Qawāʿid 356.5 et seq.) are set out with the tepid comment: 
“And the author — may God have mercy on him — chose Avicenna’s doctrine with respect 
to their productivity.”11 Indeed, one of the passages in the Jawhar, on the consequents that 
can follow from a given antecedent, represents a complete about-face, and Ḥillī joins the 
followers of Fakhr al-Dīn (speci'cally, Khūnajī): “The later scholars rejected these two 
10. al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, al-Jawhar al-naḍīd fī sharḥ Kitāb al-Tajrīd (ed. Qum 1984).
11. Jawhar 108.u‒109.1: wa-l-muṣannif raḥimahu llāhu khtāra madhhab abī ʿAlī ʿalā intājihi. Cf. Asrār 126.12‒129.1, 
Appendix 2: Qawāʿid 356.5 et seq.
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inferences, saying that the proof the Ancients (al-awāʾil) had for them is weak, because a 
single antecedent may entail two contradictories… and this [doctrine of the later scholars] 
is the truth.”12 People can of course undergo a sudden change of heart, but more often than 
not it takes a few years to abandon views which have wide systemic rami'cation. On my 
reading, the Jawhar betrays a sense of shift in Ḥillī’s commitment to the various positions 
defended in the Qawāʿid. In other words, he appears through these three works as a 
thoughtful logician prepared to change his views after due re*ection. The shift in doctrine 
from Qawāʿid to Jawhar, however slight, is an important precursor to the positive attitude to 
the Shamsīya taken by his student, Taḥtānī.
Ḥillī wrote at least two other works on logic which are lost. One of these — Kāshif al-astār fī 
sharḥ kashf al-asrār — was almost certainly a commentary on Khūnajī’s advanced summa on 
logic, Kashf al-asrār ʿan ghawāmiḍ al-afkār (The Disclosure of Secrets from the Obscurities of 
Thoughts, henceforth Kashf).13 In light of this work (and Ḥillī’s later acceptance of Khūnajī’s 
doctrine to do with impossible antecedents), it is noteworthy that the part of the Qawāʿid 
given over to pathologising Kātibī’s most objectionable doctrine rehearses Khūnajī’s views 
accurately (Appendix 2: Qawāʿid 300.9: dhahaba ṣāḥibu l-kashf ilā…); these points argue a close
acquaintance with a di0cult logician. Ḥillī also wrote commentaries on a number of 
comprehensive philosophical classics, including Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt, 
Suhrawardī’s Kitāb al-talwīḥāt and Rāzī’s al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī l-ḥikma. Each of these 
12. Noted in Khaled El-Rouayheb, “Impossible Antecedents and Their Consequences: Some Thirteenth-
Century Arabic Discussions,” History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (2009): 211, ft. 10; see Jawhar 48.9‒10. Cf. Asrār 
98.18‒u, and Qawāʿid 329.11‒13: “yet on his rule which we mentioned earlier, namely, that a given thing entails
two contradictories… none of these inferences goes through.” I say a little more about this below.
13. Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī, Kashf al-asrār ʿan ghawāmiḍ al-afkār, ed. by Khaled El-Rouayheb (Tehran: Iranian 
Institute of Philosophy & Institute of Islamic Studies, Free University of Berlin, 2010).
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commentaries must have devoted a substantial section to logic. Once we have studied all of 
Ḥillī’s surviving works on logic, I suspect that we will hold him in higher regard as a 
logician than we tend to now.
ḤILLĪ’S EXEGETICAL STRATEGY IN THE QAWĀʿID
The Qawāʿid, opening with a time-honoured topos, is presented as an explanation and 
expansion of a text found di0cult by Kātibī’s readers.
When a group of those with whom I worked in research came across the Shamsīya… they 
laboured to understand its bene'cial points, subtleties, and problematic questions 
(given its brevity and summary nature). They asked me to dictate a commentary to deal 
with these questions, and I agreed, notwithstanding my shortcomings in the discipline. 
(Qawāʿid 179.7‒180.2)
And Ḥillī concludes the Qawāʿid saying, 
This is the end of what we wanted to set out in commentary on this epistle, having 
intended only to elucidate it; we have not turned to mention what we hold to be the 
truth, except in a few places. We have left that task to the Kitāb al-Asrār [al-khafīya]. 
(Qawāʿid 415.7‒9)
In consequence, the Qawāʿid follows the text of the Shamsīya. (I should mention in passing 
that it does so in a way that di(ers slightly from the lemmatisation that became standard 
after Taḥtānī; this suggests that the lemmatisation is an artefact of the commentary 
tradition, and was not indicated by Kātibī himself.) Crucially, the Qawāʿid is not a thorough-
going critique. None the less, it should be read in tandem with the Asrār, a book which often
attacks Kātibī-style positions as it sets out its insights. The pairing with the Asrār changes 
the overall nature of the Qawāʿid.
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At the opening of the Qawāʿid, Ḥillī speaks of Kātibī in what seem to be glowing terms, as 
“the most eminent of the later scholars” (afḍal al-mutaʾakhkhirīn; Qawāʿid 179.8). Comparison
between the Qawāʿid and the Asrār shows however that “the later scholars” of the Asrār hold
the same views as Kātibī and his fellow-travellers, a group referred to by Ḥillī from the 
beginning of the Qawāʿid as “Fakhr al-Dīn and his followers” (Fakhr al-Dīn wa-atbāʿuhu; 
Qawāʿid 183.4).14 
This 'rst intervention in the Qawāʿid comes at the 'rst lemma of the Shamsīya. Kātibī 
presents the terms “conception” (taṣawwur) and “assent” (taṣdīq) and the doctrine that an 
assent is an aggregate of conceptions and a judgment (ḥukm). This provokes Ḥillī to write:
This is in the usage of Fakhr al-Dīn and his followers, and it di(ers from the technical 
usage of the Ancients (al-qudamāʾ); for they considered the assent to be the judgment 
itself alone, and they considered the conception a condition for the assent. (Qawāʿid 
183.4‒5)
In the Asrār, however, Ḥillī doesn’t merely dismiss the doctrine as a matter of technical 
usage, he goes on to call it an error (wa-huwa khaṭaʾ; Asrār 11.15‒12.17, at 11.pu). Ḥillī has 
nailed his colours to the mast in the 'rst twenty lines of the Qawāʿid, especially when we 
read it in light of the Asrār. Whatever else he is, he is not a Rāzian logician.15
So Ḥillī has only to mention Rāzī or his followers to prompt his readers to look for more 
information in the Asrār. Indeed, he can be even less explicit. When Kātibī says in the 'fth 
14. “Later scholars” can be ambiguous in what it refers to; for example, note that at Qawāʿid 398.pu the later 
scholars are simply those who come after Aristotle. But more often than not it refers to the Rāzians.
15. Nor, at points — and in Ḥillī’s view, to his credit —, is Kātibī: Rāzī claimed that every example of 
signi'cation by correspondence entails signi'cation by implication, but Kātibī in this instance rightly di(ered
(Qawāʿid 198.24‒199.1).
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lemma that the subject matter of logic is conceptions and assents, Ḥilli seems to agree: 
“The subject of logic is of course conception and assent; but there is a discussion about this 
matter which it would not be appropriate to set out here” (Qawāʿid 190.13‒14). In search of 
what the discussion involves, the reader of the Qawāʿid can turn to the Asrār to 'nd that this
doctrine, however it is disambiguated, is simply one more error of the later scholars (wa-
ẓanna l-mutaʾakhkhirūna anna mawḍūʿahu huwa l-taṣawwur wa-l-taṣdīq… wa-hādhā ayḍan khaṭaʾ; 
Asrār 10.pu‒11.14, at 10.pu and 11.3). Again, when Kātibī deals with the what-is-it question, 
he sets out a test for various stages of the answer (“part of what is said in answer to what is 
it, if it is said by correspondence, is called what occurs on the path to what something is…; 
if it is mentioned by containment, it is called intrinsic to the answer to what is it”).16 In the 
Qawāʿid, Ḥillī is mild in his reaction:
This is the technical usage of Fakhr al-Dīn and his followers. The Ancients (al-awāʾil) 
considered that what occurs on the path to what something is the more general 
essential (al-dhātī al-aʿamm), and what is given as intrinisic to the answer to what is it the
essential simpliciter. (Qawāʿid 234.3‒5)
But — once again — the problem is not simply a matter of terminology. Ḥillī goes on in the 
Asrār:
The later scholars claimed (zaʿamū) that what is intrinsic [to the answer to what is it] is 
that which is mentioned by containment of the parts (bi-l-taḍammun mina l-ajzāʾ), and 
that which occurs on the path [to what the thing is] (al-wāqiʿ fī l-ṭarīq) is that which is 
mentioned by correspondence (bi-l-muṭābaqa). This is a fruitless alteration (taghyīr lā 
fāʾida fīhi), given that “what is intrinsic” covers that which is mentioned whether by 
correspondence or containment, and that which occurs on the path [to what the thing 
16. Correspondence (muṭābaqa) and containment (taḍammun) are technical terms for di(erent kinds of 
signi'cation (cf. Ishārāt 1.6); the technical details aren’t important for what I’m trying to illustrate, which is 
the procedure Ḥillī follows .
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is] is proper to the more general essential, which is mentioned 'rst and then restricted 
by the di(erentia. (Asrār 30.16‒apu)
In short, the test Kātibī puts forward to sort terms into those mentioned as intrinsic to the 
answer to what is it, and those mentioned on the path to what the thing is, is wrong. 
Further, the test takes two terms of art (correspondence, containment), terms which ramify
through every region of Avicenna’s logic, and misrepresents their philosophical utility.
I don’t intend to dwell on such express interventions one after another, though — in the 
hope of helping anyone who shoulders the worthy task of analysing the di(erences 
between the logical schools of Rāzī and Ṭūsī  — here is a list of other passages where the 
Qawāʿid mentions the followers of Fakhr al-Dīn or the later scholars (excluding the material 
given in Appendix 2 below): whether correspondence entails implication (Qawāʿid 198.24 et 
seq.); how elements of a de'nition are properly ordered (Qawāʿid 239.1 et seq.); whether a 
proposition with a paronymous term as predicate needs a copula (Qawāʿid 247.12 et seq.); 
how to de'ne contraposition properly (not actually a reference to the later scholars as 
such, but to Kātibī, who di(ers in this matter from the Ancients: hādhā ʿalā raʾyi l-muṣannif 
wa-qad khālafa fīhi raʾya l-qudamāʾ, Qawāʿid 315.10 et seq.); whether those who agree with 
Kātibī about impossible antecedents can o(er proofs for transformations of conditionals 
(Qawāʿid 325.2‒329.13); whether begging the question is a formal or a material fallacy 
(Qawāʿid 408.9‒12).
We may draw two closely related conclusions from this overview of the Qawāʿid. First, by 
identifying the followers of Rāzī and then distancing himself from them, Ḥillī has managed 
to imply that by his time two distinct schools of logic had crystallised. Further, although 
there is no direct reference to Ṭūsī’s Ḥall, many of the di(erences between Ṭūsī and Rāzī 
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which are set out in the Ḥall are reprised in the Qawāʿid.17 Ḥillī sets himself up in a role 
relative to Kātibī which parallels the role Ṭūsī plays relative to Rāzī. The second conclusion 
is prompted by Ayman Shihadeh’s recent discussion of the two genres of philosophical 
commentary, the exegetical and the aporetic (the 'rst is devoted to exposition of the text, 
the second, to raising objections to it).18 Ḥillī’s Qawāʿid functions perfectly for the most part 
as an exegetical commentary, though whenever it mentions Rāzī and his followers, or the 
later scholars, we are given notice to bring in material from the Asrār. This extra material 
has the e(ect of transforming the Qawāʿid into an aporetic commentary, perhaps the 
earliest aporetic response by a follower of Ṭūsī to a logic treatise by a follower of Rāzī.
ḤILLĪ ON KĀTIBĪ’S SYLLOGISTIC
Generally speaking, then, the Qawāʿid is fairly muted in its criticism of Kātibī’s logic: it 
sounds a gentle warning from time to time, and the reader can seek “what we hold to be 
the truth” in the Asrār. There are however two series of passages in the Qawāʿid in which 
Ḥillī descends to detailed analysis and rejection of Kātibī’s position. At these two points, the
Qawāʿid is straightforwardly aporetic. The 'rst is where Kātibī deals with hypothetical 
propositions. In what was then the recent past, Khūnajī had suggested that “two 
contradictory propositions may follow from the same impossible antecedent, and closely 
17. This is not the place to provide a list of the passages in the Ḥall at which Ṭūsī takes issue with Rāzī; but 
note among them Ḥall 193 (Rāzī on what is said in answer to what is it), 498 (on the analysis of begging the 
question; Ḥillī doesn’t follow Ṭūsī here), and passim in paths 3, 4, 5 and 7 on the modal syllogistic.
18. Ayman Shihadeh, “al-Rāzī’s commentary on Avicenna’s Pointers: The con*uence of exegesis and aporetics,”
draft paper, accessed June 22nd 2016, https://www.academia.edu/25579804: 11 et seq. It’s not so much the 
distinction (one made fairly commonly) which is helpful, but the discussion of assessing the elastic boundary 
between the two.
‒11‒
related to this point… that if an antecedent implied a consequent, then it would do so no 
matter how it was strengthened”; Kātibī seemed to accept these claims.19 According to Ḥillī,
however, once these principles are accepted, it is no longer possible to construct proofs for 
the inference of — and here I limit myself to one of many possible examples — “always: 
either A is not B or C is D” from “always: if A is B then C is D.” Kātibī puts this inference 
forward in the Shamsīya (lemma 87), “but on the rule which Kātibī mentioned in his other 
works… this will not go through” (Qawāʿid 327.13‒14, 327.u). In short, Ḥillī denies that Kātibī
is entitled to a number of the inferences he takes to be valid in the Shamsīya. I think that if 
these inferences are invalid, it would have considerable repercussions for Kātibī’s larger 
system, in which case Ḥillī’s attacks (Qawāʿid 325‒329), if successful, are serious. None the 
less, I set this matter to one side to concentrate on the second and even more serious 
intervention in the Qawāʿid, concerning what amounts to the structuring principle for two 
thirds of the Shamsīya.
This second intervention is the series of passages (translated in Appendix 2) in which Ḥillī 
attacks Kātibī’s syllogistic system. This attack needs to be read against the preceding 
century of commentatorial engagement with the Ishārāt, beginning with Rāzī’s work in the 
late 1170s; this engagement transformed the Ishārāt into the Shamsīya. Appendix 1 
illustrates what this claim means by taking two lemmata with far-reaching systemic 
consequences as examples; the appendix contains texts which represent the main issues in 
play and the development of doctrine through the commentators’ engagement. Here I 
con'ne myself to speaking of matters in broad overview.
19. El-Rouayheb, “Impossible Antecedents,” 209, 211.
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Rāzī argued that Avicenna should respect the distinction between alethic and temporal 
modalities (between, for example, “every C is necessarily B” and “every C is always B”) 
(Appendix 1: Text 7); his fractious disciple Khūnajī made the stronger claim (Appendix 1: 
Text 11) that Avicenna actually did respect the distinction, though the way he expressed it 
in the Shifāʾ and the Ishārāt was often sloppy. There are good reasons for an Ashʿarite to 'nd
philosophical space for the distinction, but — and my observation is based on reading only 
a fraction of the relevant texts — the arguments for the distinction arose directly from 
consideration of Avicenna’s larger philosophical system.20
Once in place, the distinction highlights — at least for Rāzī and his followers — problems in 
some inferences Avicenna defends in his syllogistic (Appendix 1: Texts 12 & 13; a summary 
is given after Text 7); these are inferences where Avicenna seems to slide from possibility to
actuality. To resolve these problems, Rāzī modi'ed the syllogistic by introducing two ways 
to read the subject term of the propositions used as premises in the syllogistic: the 
essentialist reading — the one Rāzī was more interested in — and the externalist reading 
(Appendix 1: Texts 8 & 10). In doing so, he produced two slightly di(erent series of 
inferences, both with more cogent proofs than those Avicenna had o(ered. At the same 
time, Rāzī opened himself up for criticism, 'rst, for failing in the essentialist reading to 
respect natural language (in the same way that Fārābī had failed to respect it) (Appendix 1: 
Text 13, referring to the reading attacked in Text 9); secondly, for providing a subject term 
in the externalist reading such that “every C” only really means some of the Cs (Appendix 1:
Text 6); and thirdly, for failing to allow in either reading for a proposition with an 
20. A preliminary exploration of the issues involved, with relevant texts, is given in Tony Street, “Faḫraddin 
al-Rāzī’s Critique of Avicennan Logic,” in Logik und Theologie. Das Organon im arabischen und lateinischen 
Mittelalter, ed. by Ulrich Rudolph and Dominik Perler (Leiden: Brill, 2005).
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impossible subject term (as would be necessary, to take one example, if a Muslim were to 
try to derive unwelcome conclusions for a Zoroastrian opponent from a claim like “the co-
creator exists”) (Appendix 1: Text 18).
Perhaps in response to the last of these criticisms, Khūnajī modi'ed the essentialist reading
of the subject term so it could deal with impossible subjects. Propositions with such a 
modi'ed subject term however conduce to a number of conclusions unpalatable for 
someone trained in classical syllogistic (Appendix 1: Text 14).21 A number of logicians 
following on Khūnajī attempted to repair his essentialist reading (Appendix 1: Texts 15, 16 
& 17), and it is the modi'ed reading they jointly produce which Kātibī presents brie*y (and 
then ignores) in the Shamsīya. Khūnajī also examined the syllogistic produced by the 
externalist reading Rāzī had legislated, and showed it to be a consistent system with cogent 
proofs. This is the system Kātibī explores  — or, more exactly, adopts — in the Shamsīya. 
To understand Ḥillī’s counterattack against the Rāzians, two of his underlying assumptions 
should be made explicit. First, he never doubted that it was possible to provide a consistent 
interpretation of Avicenna’s syllogistic by clearly restating the elements of Avicenna’s 
original exposition. This was in contrast to Khūnajī, who had come to regard any attempt to
provide an interpretation of Avicenna’s syllogistic with a uni'ed reading of the subject 
term as misdirected charity (Appendix 1: Text 12). Secondly, at least in the Qawāʿid, Ḥillī 
assumed that Rāzī’s insistence on distinguishing alethic from temporal modalities does not 
merit any attention. Perhaps he thought Avicenna’s proofs — properly understood — took 
the distinction into account and still went through, so that none of the inconsistencies 
21. Khūnajī’s treatment of modal conversion is presented in translation in Tony Street, “Afḍal al-Dīn al-
Khūnajī (d. 1248) on the Conversion of Modal Propositions,” Oriens 42 (2014): 454–513.
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which had worried Rāzī arise. Perhaps he thought the distinction baseless or 
inconsequential. It would be worth exploring whether he dealt with this or the related 
matter of the principle of plenitude elsewhere in his writings.
As foreshadowed above, the counterattack proper begins in the Qawāʿid by underlining the 
fact that Kātibī has no way to give truth-conditions for a proposition like “the vacuum is 
impossible,” which is to say, for a proposition an Avicennan philosopher takes to be 
unproblematically true (Appendix 2, Qawāʿid 254.6). Equally disturbing, Kātibī’s preferred 
reading of the proposition, with an externalist subject term, means by “every C” — as has 
been pointed out above — only some of what is C, not all of it (Appendix 2, Qawāʿid 254.16). 
By going on immediately to state Avicenna’s account of the subject term, Ḥillī is able to 
highlight the fact that it is — prima facie — free from both of these shortcomings (Appendix
2, Qawāʿid 254.u).
I think the fact that Rāzī and Kātibī can’t give truth-conditions for a proposition with an 
impossible subject is seen by Ḥillī as one of the fatal *aws in Kātibī’s readings of the subject 
term, and rightly so: the logic won’t be able to trace consequences from an opponent’s 
impossible claims, because it has no account of a proposition with which to state those 
claims. Ḥillī’s student Taḥtānī — on this question completely in line with Kātibī — is 
defensive about the shortcoming (Appendix 1: Text 18). The only Rāzian to have modi'ed 
the essentialist reading to work for propositions with impossible subjects is Khūnajī, but his
essentialist proposition leads to a series of conversions  (and other inferences) which are 
radically di(erent from those defended by Avicenna (Appendix 2, Qawāʿid 300.9).
Ḥillī’s counterattack, then, highlights the fact that the Rāzians o(er students of logic two 
readings of the subject term, both of which su(er from shortcomings which do not a3ict 
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Avicenna’s reading. He goes on to show that the Rāzians also fail to understand Avicenna’s 
proofs, above all by failing to understand a technique which is deployed in proving, 'rst, 
that “no C is possibly B” converts to “no B is possibly C”, and secondly, that “every C is 
possibly B” and “every B is necessarily A” produce “every C is necessarily A” (among other 
inferences). This technique, which proceeds “on the hypothesis that the possible occurs” 
(ʿalā taqdīr wuqūʿi l-mumkin) is presented by Ḥillī twice (Appendix 2, Qawāʿid 302.1, 356.5 et 
seq.);22 the technique is defended against the acute criticism of Khūnajī (Appendix 2, 
Qawāʿid 303.8), yet presented using terms borrowed from his Kashf.23 I have to confess that I 
can’t see how Ḥillī’s argument against the Rāzians can work, but Ḥillī for one is convinced 
he has a technique to clear up the apparent inconsistencies which troubled Fakhr al-Dīn. In 
light of this technique, there is no call for the long series of Rāzian modi'cations to 
Avicenna’s system.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
I want to end by o(ering observations on a number of matters, some quite speci'c, others 
more general. The 'rst is how negative Ḥillī’s commentary really is. If it’s successful, it’s 
lethal for Kātibī’s syllogistic. If Ḥillī is right, the construction of Kātibī’s neat new system is 
motivated by an error in understanding an argument-technique central to building 
Avicenna’s syllogistic. The alternative truth-conditions stipulated for the modal 
propositions produce two models, both of which are *awed with respect to the range of 
22. The elements of the technique are explored in Tony Street, “An Outline of Avicenna’s Syllogistic,” Archiv 
für Geschichte der Philosophie 84 (2002): 129–60, at 141‒142; the technique is given an extremely charitable 
interpretation in Paul Thom, “Logic and Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Modal Syllogistic,” in The Unity of Science in
the Arabic Tradition, edited by Shahid Rahman, Tony Street, and Hassan Tahiri (London: Springer, 2008).
23. Street, “Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī on Conversion,” 475; cf. Kashf 136.1 et seq.
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reference of the subject term. Along with these *aws are the problems Ḥillī claimed in the 
Qawāʿid dogged the account of hypothetical propositions. These problems should mean 
that — and I confess that I haven’t seen Ḥillī make the claim — Kātibī had no way to provide 
an account of the contradictories of compound propositions. Kātibī’s system depends on 
poor understanding of logical technique, inadequately drawn truth-conditions, and 
incoherent claims about propositional logic.
It was 'fty or so years before the Shamsīya found the Taḥrīr, the text that consecrated it as 
the teaching text it has since remained. It was one of Ḥillī’s students, Taḥtānī, who wrote 
the Taḥrīr in 1329; in the intervening years, Ḥillī had adopted at least one doctrine that 
made Kātibī’s logic less objectionable to him and his followers (the rule to do with 
impossible antecedents). Taḥtānī himself was able to treat the Shamsīya as he did because 
he respected the contributors to the commentary tradition which had grown up around the
Ishārāt with which Kātibī worked. Taḥtānī o(ered more criticisms, numerically, than the 
young Ḥillī. But he believed Kātibī was assembling the right materials, asking the right 
questions, and suggesting helpful answers.
And that brings me to my second observation, to do with the nature of the logical traditions
doing battle over the commentary tradition encrusted on the Ishārāt. What Ḥillī referred to 
as “the author and a group of later scholars,” I have referred to as the Rāzians; what Ḥillī 
referred to as “the Ancients” (al-awāʾil, al-qudamāʾ), I would refer to as Avicenna and the 
Avicennan purists. The dynamism is coming entirely from the Rāzians and the 
conversation, often bad-tempered, that they conduct among themselves. Unlike the 
Avicennan purists, the Rāzians explored suggestions that arose in the commentary 
tradition wherever such explorations led them. It is noteworthy how entirely internal to 
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the logical tradition — and especially the Rāzian logical tradition — are the dynamic factors 
at play. In the past, I have suggested that Ashʿarite worries about essentialism lie behind 
the formulation of the externalist  truth-conditions of the Rāzians. But the commentary 
tradition itself has all the explanatory material needed to go from Ishārāt 4.5 and the 
doctrine it contains through a complete volte-face ending in Kātibī’s treatment of the 
subject term. (Of course, Ashʿarite concerns could well have determined the Shamsīya’s 
adoption in the madrasas, but that’s an entirely di(erent question.) 
With that, I come to the last and most general of the re*ections I have to o(er.  I suppose in
the past I have tended to look on the focus-text (matn) of a commentary as primary, always 
prior to the commentaries written to explicate it. But, as exempli'ed by the material 
gathered in Appendix 1 below, it was arguments in commentary on the Ishārāt which 
pushed Kātibī to write his new focus-text, and which determined precisely the 
formulations he used in his own lemmata. The most important of the texts for these 
formulations is probably Khūnajī’s Kashf, which I admit is only a commentary if that term is
taken in a broad sense (taken to mean, for example, any text that follows the same 
structure and can be made to speak directly, and with the same technical terms, to 
important passages in an older text and its surrounding commentaries). Just as focus-texts 
call forth commentaries, it turns out that passages in commentaries crystallise as new 
focus-texts. Further, reading the Qawāʿid has forced me to realise that the arguments which 
determined how the Shamsīya took shape carried on seamlessly to play a part in its ultimate
reception.
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Kātibī adopted truth-conditions for his modal propositions (that is, the externalist reading) 
'rst rejected by Avicenna,24 and treated without much interest by Rāzī, later rehabilitated 
by Khūnajī and Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 1265). Kātibī did so because he had inherited a 
conviction that a cluster of problems were generated by, and themselves generated, 
systematic tension in Avicenna’s logic. These problems centred above all on modal 
conversions and the productivity of certain syllogistic mixes (see Appendix 1, Texts 
12 & 13). None of these problems had any consequence outside the syllogistic system; they 
were rather internal problems whose solution was to be judged by criteria internal to the 
system. Kātibī’s solution was, e(ectively, to walk away from these problems. And it’s in light
of that decision that we need to read Ḥillī’s commentary. It’s an attempt to push the 
Shamsīya back into the commentary tradition from which it had come, to block it from 
becoming a focus-text, and to reduce it to a series of short reports from the incoherent 
conversation of the Rāzian logicians.
24. Who of course rejected it before it was called the externalist reading; see Appendix 1; the reading is stated 
in Text 2, criticised in Text 6.
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Appendix 1: Readings of the Subject Term
In this appendix, I try to show how Avicenna’s comments on the subject term in Ishārāt 4.5 
are transformed into the stipulations Kātibī gives in §45 of the Shamsīya25 for the essentialist
(bi-ḥasabi l-ḥaqīqa) and externalist (bi-ḥasabi l-khārij) readings of the subject term of a 
proposition. I have translated many of these texts before in one article or another (though 
never Texts 2, 5, 9 or 11), especially to highlight the scale of Khūnajī’s contribution to 
logical discussions. I hope that — presented all together — they convey a sense of the 
cumulative and transformative e(ect of the commentary literature and how it crystallised 
as a new focus-text. I concentrate on a cardinal lemma of the Shamsīya which determines 
much of Kātibī’s treatment of the syllogistic.
PREMLIMINARIES: THE TRANSFORMATION
More speci'cally, I try to tell part of the story about how the tradition begins with these 
lemmata in the Ishārāt:
[Text 1]
4.5.1. Know that when we say “every C is B”, we do not mean the totality (kullīya) of C is 
the totality of B. Rather, we mean that every single thing described as C, be it in mental 
supposition or extramental existence, be it described as C always, or sometimes, or 
whatever… [is B in some way]. (Ishārāt 280)
[Text 2]
4.5.10 According to the method some people follow, “every C is B” and so forth has 
25. I provide an account of how I number the lemmata of the Shamsīya in a chapter (“Kātibī, Taḥtānī and the 
Shamsiyya”) of the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy, ed. Khaled El-Rouayheb and Sabine 
Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press); for present purposes, the lemma is Shamsīya 252.pu‒253.3.
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another sense, that is, it means that every C at a given time (fī l-ḥāl) is described as B for 
the time of its existence. (Ishārāt 285)
and transform them into this lemma in the Shamsīya:
[Text 3]
45. Our statement “every C is B” is used occasionally according to the essence, and its 
meaning is that everything which, were it to exist, would be a C (taken from among 
possible items) would be, in so far as it were to exist, a B; that is, everything that is an 
implicant of C is an implicant of B. And occasionally it is used according to external 
existence, and its meaning is that every C externally, whether at the time of the 
judgment or before it or after it, is B externally. (Shamsīya 252.pu‒253.3)
Two minor points from the later logicians. First, logicians at least as early as Khūnajī 
(among them Kātibī) shift the discussion arising from Ishārāt 4.5 to the section in their 
treatises which corresponds with Ishārāt 3.3 (where Avicenna also touches on the subject 
term). Secondly, Taḥtānī’s comments on Kātibī’s text above guide me in my translation of 
ḥaqīqīya as “essentialist” and khārijīya as “externalist” by :
[Text 4]
“Every C is B” is considered at times according to the essence (whereupon it’s called 
“essentialist”, as though [the subject] is an essence in a proposition used in the 
sciences), and at other times according to external reality (whereupon it’s called 
“externalist”, and what is meant by “external” is what is external to the senses). (Taḥrīr 
94.6‒94.8)
Two less minor points from Avicenna. First, his stipulations about the subject term may 
have been read by the later logicians in tandem with some remarks in the ʿIbāra of the 
Shifaʾ:
[Text 5]
The meaning of the a0rmation which is sometimes used for things which in one respect
do not exist — when it is seen that the mind judges them as being such and such — is 
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that, were they to be existents with an existence in the mind, they would be such and 
such. It is in this way that it is said, “the vacuum has dimensions.”26
Secondly, Avicenna o(ers in the Qiyās of the Shifaʾ a critique of the externalist reading in 
Text 2, a critique which is reprised by Ṭūsī and Ḥillī:
[Text 6]
If we say “every B is A” and what is meant is every one of the things existing at a given 
time as B, then it is some of what is described as B; but our utterance “every B” is more 
general than that.27
RĀZĪ: THE BASIC DISTINCTION AND THE LAW WUJIDA PHRASE
The transformation begins with Rāzī. Rāzī insists in his Sharḥ al-Ishārāt on a sharp 
distinction between alethic and temporal modalities:
[Text 7]
But I say that what is meant by necessity is not what is meant by perpetuity, otherwise 
their question as to whether there can be a non-necessary perpetual just amounts to 
asking whether there can be a non-perpetual perpetual — and this is obviously 
nonsense.28
Rāzī goes on to argue that an Avicennan must make space for this distinction (between, on 
the one hand, necessity and perpetuity and, on the other, possibility and actual existence at
least at a time), because of commitments elsewhere in the larger philosophical system. But 
26. Avicenna, al-Shifāʾ: al-Manṭiq: al-ʿIbāra, ed. M. al-Khuḍayri ̄(Cairo: Dār al-kātib al-ʿarabī li-l-ṭibāʿah wa-l-
nashr, 1970), 80.13‒81.1. I am grateful to Wilfrid Hodges for bringing this passage to my attention.
27. Avicenna, al-Shifāʾ: al-Manṭiq: al-Qiyās, ed. S. Zayed (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-ʿāmma li-shuʾūn al-maṭābiʿ al-
amīrīya, 1964), 29.7‒10.
28. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt, ed. by A. Najafzāda (Tehran: Institute of Islamic Studies, Tehran–
McGill Universities, 2005), 187.7‒9. The Arabic of the full argument is given, along with a translation, in the 
appendix of Street, “Faḫraddin al-Rāzī’s Critique of Avicennan Logic.”
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once a logician insists on the distinction, the question arises: Is the subject term ampliated 
to the possible (such that “every C” is understood as “every possible C”) or not? A number 
of inferences for which Avicenna o(ers proofs would be easier to prove if it did so ampliate.
I have marked these inferences o( in Texts 12 and 13 below, taken from Khūnajī’s Kashf; this
is the neatest summary of the problems I have found among the writers in the Rāzian 
tradition. Taken along with some comments of Rāzī in one of his short works about 
conversion of the one-sided actuality proposition (“every C is at least once B”),29 they allow 
us to set out the Avicennan claims which — taken together — troubled the Rāzians:
(1a) a necessity e-proposition converts as a necessity proposition,
(1b) an a0rmative possibility proposition converts as a possibility proposition,
(1c) a 'rst-'gure syllogism with a possibility proposition as minor premise produces, 
(2a) a necessity a0rmative proposition implies an absolute proposition, and
(2b) an a0rmative absolute proposition converts as an absolute proposition;
troublesome given that — as I say — the Rāzians refused to elide the distinction between 
temporal and alethic modalities.
Led by a plausible reading of Avicenna’s treatment of the subject term in Ishārāt 4.5 
(especially in light of Text 6 above), Rāzī — in a friendly gloss (the third kind Wisnovsky 
describes, a complete de'nition of part of the conceptual vocabulary)30 — introduced the 
distinction between essentialist and externalist readings. The essentialist is Rāzī’s preferred
reading, and what he took to be a clearer statement of what Avicenna had tried to stipulate.
(For the following texts, I use the fuller formulations of the Mulakhkhaṣ rather than the 
29. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Lubāb Al-Ishārāt (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1936) 24.16‒20; translated in Street, “An 
Outline of Avicenna’s Syllogistic,” 154.
30. Robert Wisnovsky, “Avicennism and Exegetical Practice in the Early Commentaries on the Ishārāt,” Oriens 
41 (2013): 349–78, at 355.
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slightly later Sharḥ al-Ishārāt ad 4.5, 201.3 et seq.) For “every C is B”, Rāzī has the reading 
mean that C,
[Text 8] 
…were it to exist externally (law wujida fī l-khārij) it would be true of it that it is C, 
whether it exists externally or not. For we can say “every triangle is a 'gure” even if 
there are no triangles existent externally. The meaning is rather that everything which 
would be a triangle were it to exist would be — in so far as it existed — a 'gure…31
 Like Avicenna, Rāzī rejected Fārābī’s way of ampliating to the possible, and that is why — if 
we are to believe Ṭūsī32 — he used the phrase law wujida jīm. 
[Text 9]
[Fārābī] has the right to intend by “every C ” whatever he wants, but language rejects it 
(lākinna l-lughata taʾbāhu), because “black” doesn’t deal with a substance always devoid of
blackness, even if the substance is possibly described by it. (Mulakhkhaṣ 142.5‒7)
Rāzī was less interested in the externalist reading which Avicenna had rejected in Text 6, 
such that by “every C ” we mean every single thing which exists externally among the 
individual Cs. In the externalist,
[Text 10]
…we mean by “every C ” every single thing which exists externally among the individual 
Cs… On this hypothesis, were there no septagons existent externally, it wouldn’t be 
correct to say “every septagon is a 'gure”; if the only 'gures existent externally were 
triangles, it would be correct to say “every 'gure is a triangle.” On the 'rst reading, 
[that is, the essentialist reading,] both of these would be false. (Mulakhkhaṣ 142.13–143.1)
31. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Manṭiq al-Mulakhkhaṣ, ed. by A. Ḳarāmalekī & A. Aṣgharīnezhad. (Tehran: I.S.U. Press, 
2002), 141.7‒10. (Henceforth Mulakhkhaṣ.)
32. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Taʿdīl al-miʿyār fī naqd Tanzīl al-afkār, in Collected Texts and Papers on Logic and Language, 
ed. by M. Mohaghegh and T. Izutsu (Tehran 1971), 162. (Henceforth Taʿdīl.)
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Armed with his essentialist reading, Rāzī took himself to need only to modify Avicenna’s 
claim that the a0rmative absolute converts to an absolute proposition ([2b] above, and in 
Text 12 below; Rāzī has it convert as a possibility proposition); all the other claims in Texts 
12 and 13 now go through. The repair is minor, the mood, irenic.
A summary to this point: Kātibī gets the distinction itself, and the basic formulation of the 
essentialist reading with the subjunctive phrase, law wujida, from Rāzī.33
KHŪNAJĪ: THE EXPLORATION OF THE IMPOSSIBLE
Fifty years later, Rāzī’s student Khūnajī considered Ishārāt 4.5 along with Rāzī’s comments 
in the Mulakhkhaṣ and the Sharḥ; as mentioned, he shifted the discussion from the place 
corresponding to Ishārāt 4.5 to what corresponds with Ishārāt 3.3. When it came to the 
distinction between alethic and temporal modalities, Khūnajī went further than Rāzī: there 
was no need to force Avicenna to accept the distinction, because it is clear from his work 
that he did (although he often failed to express it clearly).
[Text 11]
What Avicenna has to say in most passages indicates that the necessary (al-ḍarūrī) is the 
perpetual (al-dāʾim). It is clear that what he means is the necessary perpetual (al-dāʾim al-
wājib), namely, that which inevitably belongs to the thing, and which is inseparable from
it, due to what he says explicitly in Syllogism 1.4 when he interprets the possible as: “The 
possible is that whose existence and non-existence is not necessary; it may not exist at 
all, yet it may accompany [the thing] perpetually.” What he has to say in the Ishārāt 
agrees with this, and Bahmanyār says the same in the Taḥṣīl. So you should know that 
the perpetual is weaker than the necessary, because whatever is inseparable from the 
thing is perpetual for it, but not the other way round (because [what is possible for a 
33. Normally law is a particle marking a counterfactual conditional (see e.g. William Wright and Carl Paul 
Caspari, A Grammar of the Arabic Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932) 2: 347); in this usage, 
however, the antecedent can also be true.
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thing] may accompany it perpetually but non-necessarily, like the negation of writing 
from many men). (Kashf 93.pu‒94.6)
For him, Rāzī’s project to disambiguate Avicenna’s account of the subject term is 
misdirected charity; Avicenna had failed to work out how he intended to use the subject 
term.
[Text 12]
Perhaps Avicenna hesitated over [2b] the conversion of actuality propositions as either 
possibility or absolute propositions just because of his hesitation over technical usage. 
When he says that they convert as possibility propositions he doesn’t consider 
a0rmation in actuality with respect to the subject; when he says that they convert as 
absolute propositions, he does (because the fact the absolute follows on this technical 
usage is just about patently evident, such that it wouldn’t be appropriate for Avicenna to
deny it). (Kashf 145.11‒u)
This is a cardinal moment in the ultimate rejection of Avicenna’s modal syllogistic. Khūnajī 
is 'xing the blame on imprecision in the original technical usage; no interpretation can 
repair it. This is especially the case with Rāzī’s essentialist reading; it may square the 
problematic inferences, but it just amounts to the Fārābian ampliation he rejected in Text 9.
[Text 13]
Were we to be satis'ed that for something to be a subject the possibility [of its coming 
under the subject term would be enough], and not consider [the subject term’s] 
a0rmation of it in actuality (as Fārābī held), it would follow that [1a] the [universal] 
negative necessity proposition would convert as a necessity proposition, [1b] the 
a0rmative possibility proposition would convert as a possibility proposition, [2b] the 
conversion of actuality propositions wouldn’t result in more than possibility, and [1c] 
the syllogism in the 'rst 'gure with a minor possibility proposition would be 
productive, as will be clear to you after coming to know what has gone before, and 
having given due consideration to the propositions under this technical usage. (Kashf 
145.4‒9)
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Khūnajī’s attack on aspects of the commentary tradition on the original lemmata is 
coordinated with two alternative proposals. One is to rehabilitate the rejected externalist 
reading, if only because of the clarity of treatment it allows; Khūnajī explored the reading 
thoroughly and accurately. Almost of all the syllogistic proofs we 'nd in the Shamsīya are in
a form they were given by Khūnajī.
The second is to relegislate Rāzī’s essentialist reading to deal with impossible items as well. 
Khūnajī was tempted to this by the subjunctive phrase, law wujida jīm, intended by Rāzī to 
rule out Fārābī’s unrestricted ampliation, and perhaps also by Avicenna’s remark in Text 5. 
As a result of this relegislation, Khūnajī ended up with radically di(erent inferences in his 
syllogistic,34 some of which are mentioned by Ḥillī (Qawāʿid 300.9 et seq.).
[Text 14]
…[the proposition with an essentialist subject] deals with actual, possible and impossible
items [that come under the subject term]. Were we to stipulate the possibility [of these 
items] along with [the other stipulations], their status would be that of externally 
existent things. So the eclipsed-which-is-not-a-moon, even though it is impossible, is 
among those items which would be eclipsed, were they to come to exist, even though it 
is not necessary that any would be a moon if they came to exist. (Kashf 130.7‒11)
In summary: Khūnajī gives nothing directly to Kātibī’s formulation of the essentialist 
reading, but he triggers the discussions which end in the gloss in §45 “every implicate of C 
is an implicate of B” and the rider (“taken from among possible items”), both given in Text 
14 to rule out Khūnajī-style impossibilities. His exploration of the externalist reading, on 
the other hand, is almost exactly the system Kātibī presents.
34. For his di(erent account of conversion, see Street, “Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī on Conversion.”
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ABHARĪ: THE GLOSS, AND THE FIRST FORMULATION OF THE RIDER
Abharī is the 'rst to show how many problems there are in Khūnajī’s modi'ed account of 
the essentialist reading. 
[Text 15]
On the second usage, if it is said “every C is B,” what is meant is that everything that 
would be a C were it to exist, would be a B in so far as it were to exist; that is, everything 
that has the 'rst state posited would have the second. This means that everything that is
the implicant of C is the implicant of B (anna kulla mā huwa malzūmu jīm fa-huwa malzūmu 
bāʾ). This extends to the impossible such that it is true that everything that is man and 
non-animal is a man; because, even if it’s impossible of existence, it’s none the less true 
that were it to exist it would be a non-animal man, so, were it to exist, it would be a man.
The e-proposition on this account would never be true, because when you say no man is 
a stone its contradictory is true. This is because “everything that is a-man-and-a-stone is
a man,” and “everything that is a-man-and-a-stone is a stone,” so “some man is a stone.”
From this it is clear that the i-proposition is always true. 
Since this is the case, we may restrict the subject to what is not impossible. So if we say 
“every C is B” in the essentialist reading, we mean every implicant of C among items not 
impossible in themselves or through another is the implicant of B (anna kulla mā huwa 
malzūmu jīm min al-afrādi llatī lā yamtaniʿu bi-dhātihā wa-lā bi-ghayrihā fa-huwa malzūmu 
bāʾ).35
Abharī contributes to the lemma the gloss for the subjunctive reading of the essentialist 
(law wujida jīm…) as “every implicant of C is an implicant of B” (anna kulla mā huwa malzūmu 
jīm fa-huwa malzūmu bāʾ), the insight that the Khūnajī essentialist reading makes the e-
proposition always false, and the i-proposition always true, and the 'rst formulation of a 
35. Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī, Tanzīl al-afkār, given as lemmata in Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Taʿdīl al-miʿyār fī naqd Tanzīl 
al-afkār, in Collected Texts and Papers on Logic and Language, edited by M. Mohaghegh and T. Izutsu (Tehran 1971),
160.16‒161.7. This passage, and Texts 16 and 17, were 'rst translated in Tony Street, “Appendix: Readings of 
the Subject Term,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 20, (2010): 119–24.
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rider to rule those unwelcome results out (“every implicant of C among items not 
impossible in themselves or through another”).
ṬŪSĪ: THE SECOND FORMULATION OF THE RIDER
Ṭūsī didn’t want the essentialist/externalist distinction (like Ḥillī, he thought the original 
Avicennan formulation of the subject term was — taken along with the proofs in Appendix 
2, Qawāʿid 302.1 et seq., 356.5 et seq. — durable enough to resist all the problems the Rāzians
raised), but he was still prepared to tinker with the formulations. So he pointed out that the
Khūnajī reading not only makes the i-proposition always true, as Abharī had noted; it also 
makes the o-proposition always true, even with the rider:
[Text 16]
Then Abharī *ed from these repugnant consequences [of the Khūnajī view], going some 
way back towards the truth by restricting the subject to what is not impossible in itself 
or through another. But this still won’t allow him to hold the doctrine mentioned. This is
because if we say “every C is B” by two-sided (khāṣṣa) possibility or “no C is B” by two-
sided possibility (and B is something whose joining and not joining to C is not impossible
either in itself or through another…), then it will be true that (1) “all that is C-and-B is C 
necessarily” and (2) “all that is C-and-B is B necessarily,” and (1) and (2) produce “some 
of what is C is B necessarily.” Similarly it is true that (3) “all that is C-and-not-B is C 
necessarily” and (4) “all that is C-and-not-B is not-B necessarily,” and (3) and (4) produce 
“some of what is C is not-B necessarily.” (Taʿdīl 163.20‒164.4)
At the very least, the rider will have to be modi'ed:
[Text 17]
It is necessary to restrict the subject to what is not impossible in itself. But restricting it 
to what is not impossible through another raises questions. This is because what is 
possible in itself to be C and rendered impossible by another to be C actually and 
externally (bi-l--ʿl fī l-khārij), but is supposed none the less to be C actually, must fall 
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under every C; yet it doesn’t fall [under C] on this account in consequence of the 
restriction. (Taʿdīl 164.8‒11)
At the end of these re*ections, Kātibī was able to propose a formulation which may avoid 
the problems Ṭūsī 'nds for the Abharī formulation.
POSTSCRIPT
If Avicenna’s re*ections in Text 6 really did provide the inspiration for Rāzī’s essentialist 
reading, it is ironic that the reading which 'nally developed out of the line of commentary 
on Ishārāt 4.5 is not 't for propositions with an impossible subject. Taḥtānī is apologetic 
about a situation which I think troubled Ḥillī.
[Text 18]
It is not to be levelled as a criticism that, because the craft should have general rules, 
there are propositions that cannot be taken under either of these two considerations 
(namely, those whose subjects are impossible, as in “the co-creator is impossible,” and 
“every impossible is non-existent”). Because we say: No one claims to limit all 
propositions to the essentialist and the externalist. They do however claim that 
propositions used in the sciences are used for the most part under one of these two 
considerations, so they therefore set these readings down and extract their 
quali'cations so they may thereby bene't in the sciences. The quali'cations of the 
propositions that cannot be taken under either of these two considerations are not yet 
known; the generalization of rules is only to the extent of human capacity. (Taḥrir̄ 95.pu–
96.11)
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Appendix 2: Translations from Ḥillī
ON THE SUBJECT TERM
45. [Kātibī, 252.pu‒253.3] Our statement “every C is B” is used occasionally according to 
the essence, and its meaning is that everything which, were it to exist, would be a C 
(taken from among possible items) would be, in so far as it were to exist, a B; that is, 
everything that is an implicant of C is an implicant of B. And occasionally it is used 
according to external existence, and its meaning is that every C externally, whether at 
the time of the judgment or before it or after it, is B externally.
[Ḥillī…]
[253.15] If you are acquainted with this then know also that “every C is B” under this 
consideration is used occasionally according to the essence (and its meaning is that 
everything which, were it to exist, would be a C (taken from among possible items) would 
be, in so far as it were to exist, a B), by which we mean that every implicant of C is an 
implicant of B. This proposition is called the absolute essentialist. And [“every C is B”] is 
used on other occasions according to external [existence], the meaning of which is that 
every C externally is B externally; it is not stipulated that the judgment be at the time of the
existence of C or before it or after it. This proposition is called [254] the absolute 
externalist. The proposition may have an essentialist subject and an externalist predicate, 
as “everything which, were it to exist it would be C, is B externally”; or the reverse, as 
“every C externally is, in so far as it exists, B.”
[254.6] Kātibī restricted the items in the essentialist reading to the possible to exclude 
impossible items. In consequence, it would not be correct to say “the vacuum is impossible 
(mumtaniʿ)” according to the essence, due to the impossibility (istiḥāla) of “everything 
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which were it to exist would be a vacuum is, in so far as it exists, impossible.” The later 
scholars called such a proposition the mental proposition (al-qaḍīya al-dhihnīya). 
[254.10] Know that there is matter for re*ection with respect to the author’s gloss of the 
essentialist proposition [as kullu malzūm etc.]. This is because C is not necessarily true of the
implicant of C, given what is meant by C (that is, that of which C is true). For were the 
perfect causes of C to exist,  C would exist; but “C” is not necessarily true of them.
[254.13] This is the case if the subject is “everything which, were it to exist it would be C” 
without the appositive “and”; if the appositive conjunction is used, then no distinction 
remains between the absolute [proposition] and the perpetuity [proposition] (for at this 
point the meaning of the absolute proposition would be “everything which were it to exist 
and be C would be an implicant of B”).36
[254.16] The externalist proposition is the doctrine of a certain ancient scholar, and 
Avicenna in the Shifāʾ rejected it as ridiculous (nasabahu ilā l-sakhāfa).37 Avicenna explained 
its falsity (buṭlānahu) by arguing that if we mean by “every C” what is C among the items 
that occur at a given time, it is only some of C, not all of it. 
[254.u] Know that the meaning common among most people for “every C is B” is that [255] 
every single thing of which C is said — whether veri'ed or supposed (immā taḥqīqan wa-
36. This is an argument about the formulation of the ḥaqīqī reading, whether as kullu mā law wujida wa-kāna jīm
(with the appositive), or kullu mā law wujida kāna jīm (without). If I understand correctly (and I speculate on 
something which merits proper analysis), the 'rst formulation has the e(ect of making the subject perpetual,
and therefore also — because it is entailed by whatever entails the subject — the predicate; the second does 
not have this e(ect (and therefore the predicate is not perpetual).
37. Avicenna, al-Shifāʾ: al-Manṭiq: al-Qiyās, 29.7‒10.
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immā farḍan), whether the C-ness is its substance (dhātahu) or its attribute (ṣifatahu), 
whether perpetually or not, whether existent externally or in the intellect or in mental 
supposition (fī l-farḍ al-dhihnī), and given that it is not impossible of existence in itself (li-
dhātihi) — is a B. On this understanding, the impossibilities don’t enter under the subject, 
nor does what is only potentially C (unless it is assumed to be C). If the subject is impossible 
of existence in itself, as for example the void and the atom (al-jawhar), it may be understood
according to the opinion of someone who holds that it is not impossible; on being described
as actually existing externally, as a vacuum and an atom, judgment is made of [the subject] 
in so far as what would be judged of it if it were like that.
[255.8] This is a veri'cation of this subject, and we have gone on at length here due to the 
error of the author and a group of later scholars with respect to it. 
RELATIVE STRENGTH OF EXTERNALIST AND ESSENTIALIST PROPOSITIONS
46. [Kātibī, 255.10] The distinction between the two considerations is obvious. Were 
there no squares in external existence it would be true to say “every square is a 'gure” 
under the 'rst consideration but not the second; and were there no 'gures in external 
existence other than squares, it would be correct to say “every 'gure is a square” under 
the second consideration but not the 'rst.
47. On this basis, assess the remaining quanti'ed propositions.
[Ḥillī, 255.14] On Kātibī’s technical usage, what distinguishes the absolute essentialist from 
the absolute externalist is that each one may be true while the other is not. 
[255.apu] The essentialist may be true while the externalist is not because, were we to 
suppose there were never any squares in external existence, “every square is a 'gure” 
would be true [as an essentialist]. This is because were a square to exist it would be a 'gure, 
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yet you know that no existence is stipulated for this; the externalist on the other hand 
would be false [256] due to the stipulation that its subject exist externally. On  the other 
hand, the externalist may be true while the essentialist is not because, were we to suppose 
that the 'gures in external existence were limited to squares, “every 'gure is a square”38 
would be true as an externalist proposition, because every 'gure [existing] externally 
would be a square [existing] externally. But the essentialist proposition would be false, 
because the triangle, were it to exist, would be, in so far as it were to exist, a 'gure, yet it 
would not be, in so far as it were to exist, a square.
[256.6] Neither of the two a-propositions is implicationally weaker (aʿamm) than the other 
without quali'cation, but rather they overlap in truth-conditions (baynahumā ʿumūm min 
wajh). This is so due to their distinction in truth given above, and their [common] truth in 
every matter whose externally existent items are all that can exist of those items.
[256.9] The essentialist i-proposition is weaker than its a-proposition, and than the 
externalist a- and i-propositions. The essentialist e-proposition is stronger than39 the 
externalist e-proposition (because whenever the e-essentialist is true, so is the externalist 
e-proposition, the items (afrād) under its subject being some of the items of the 
essentialist). The converse is not the case, due to the truth of the externalist e-proposition 
in the example we have given (limiting 'gures to squares); for “no 'gure is a triangle” may 
be true as an externalist, but not as an essentialist e-proposition, because some of that 
which, were it to exist, would be a 'gure, would be, in so far as it were to exist, a triangle.
38. Reading kullu shakl murabbaʿ for kullu murabbaʿ shakl at 256.3.
39. Reading akhaṣṣu min for akhaṣṣu at 256.10.
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[256.15] And the o-propositions are co-implicative.
CONVERSION
74. [Kātibī, 299.10‒16] Consider the negatives: If the negative is universal, there are 
seven modalities which cannot be converted, namely, the two temporals, the two 
hyparctics, the two possibility propositions and the general absolute. This is because of 
the impossibility of converting the strongest of them, the temporal, due to the truth of 
“no moon is possibly eclipsed at the time of standing square to the earth-sun line, not 
perpetually”, and the falsity of “some of what is eclipsed is not necessarily a moon” as a 
general possibility proposition (which is the weakest of the modalities), because 
everything which is eclipsed is a moon necessarily. If the strongest does not convert, nor
does the weaker; for were the weaker to convert, so would the stronger (because the 
implicate of the weaker is necessarily the implicate of the stronger).
[Ḥillī, 299.17] The custom of the Ancients (al-awāʾil) was 'rst to mention the status of the 
negative propositions in conversion, and so — in imitation of his forebears — the author 
begins with these propositions. Know that negative propositions are either universal [an e-
proposition], or particular [an o-proposition]. Seven of the e-propositions don’t convert, 
the ones the author mentions. This is because the temporal is the strongest of these seven 
[300], and — as we said earlier — it doesn’t convert; and if the strongest doesn’t convert, nor
does the weaker.
[300.3] The proof that [the temporal] does not convert is that “no moon is possibly eclipsed 
at the time it is at right angles to the two luminaries, not always” may be true, and its 
converse (namely, “some eclipsed is not necessarily a moon” — the one-sided possibility 
being the weakest of the modalities) false, because every eclipsed is necessarily a moon. The
proof that the remaining e-propositions fail to convert is because they are weaker than the 
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temporal; were they to convert, so would the temporal, because the implicate of the weaker
is the implicate of the stronger.
[300.9] Khūnajī held that these seven e-propositions convert to perpetuity o-propositions, 
because were “no C is always B” true, two premises would also be true. First, everything 
which is B perpetually is B just tout court — this is necessarily true. Secondly, “no always-B is
ever C” is true (otherwise its contradictory “some always-B is once C” is true; but if it is a 
minor with the original proposition as major, they produce by [Ferio] “some always-B is not
always B”, which is absurd). And if these two premises are true, they produce by [Felapton] 
“some B is never C”, which is what is sought.40
[300.apu] This proof only goes through if it is granted that the subject of the essentialist 
proposition be taken in such a way that the impossible enters into it; otherwise a rebuttal 
(manʿ) is available against the 'rst premise. But if the subject is taken on this [i.e. Khūnajī’s] 
interpretation (tafsīr), the counter-example (naqḍ) which has been mentioned will not 
work, because “some [301] eclipsed is not a moon” may be true given the eclipsed-which-is-
not-a-moon; even if it is impossible, it is such that were it to exist it would not be a moon.
[301.3] This is true if it is granted that the subject be taken on the interpretation which 
Khūnajī has put forward; but it di(ers from normal technical usage (lākinnahu mukhālifun li-
mā ʿalayhi l-iṣṭilāḥ).
40. See Street, “Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī on Conversion,” 469‒470 for a translation of Khūnajī on this 
conversion, and 485‒486 for comments on the text.
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NECESSITY E-CONVERSION
75. [Kātibī, 301.5‒8] The [universal] negative absolute necessity and absolute perpetuity 
propositions convert as a universal perpetuity, because if “no C is B” were true of 
necessity, or always, then always, “no B is C”; were it not the case, then “Some B is C” as a
general absolute proposition, and this, together with the original proposition, would 
produce “Some B is not possibly B” for the necessity proposition, and “Some B is never 
B” for the perpetuity proposition; and this is absurd.
[Ḥillī comes back to deal with §75 after §76.]
[Ḥillī, 302.1] Know that the writer di(ers from the earlier scholars (al-mutaqaddimīn) with 
respect to the conversions of the necessity and conditioned propositions; they held that 
both convert as themselves.41 With respect to the necessity proposition, this is because if 
“no C is possibly B” is true, then “no B is possibly C” is true, otherwise “some B is possibly C”
[would be true], which is impossible for a number of reasons. The 'rst of these is that, were 
it (i.e. “some B is possibly C”) true in actuality (law ṣadaqa bi-l--ʿl), it would form with the 
original proposition [“no C is possibly B”] a syllogism producing “some B is not possibly B”, 
which is impossible, so its truth in actuality is impossible.
[303.8] A certain later scholar42 said: “We don’t concede that the original remains true on 
the hypothesis that the possible occurs (ʿalā taqdīri wuqūʿi l-mumkin), such that the 
impossibility follows.” To which we answer: One of two things follows, namely, either the 
original proposition is false on the hypothesis that the possible actually occurs, or it entails 
41. The phrase “convert as themselves” (tanʿakis ka-nafsihā) means that the converse has not just the same 
quality, but also the same modality as the convertend. “The earlier scholars” are Avicenna and the Avicennan 
purists.
42. Khunajī; see Kashf 136.10 et seq.; translated in Street, “Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī on Conversion,” 475 
(argument no. 3).
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the impossible. Yet both of these alternatives is impossible, so the occurrence of the 
possible is impossible — therefore it is not possible, which is what is sought. Secondly, 
“some B is actually C” entails “some C is actually B”; yet the implicate is impossible, thus so 
too is the implicant — therefore it is not possible. Third, we suppose that “some” [of “some 
B is possibly C”] as D, such that the possibility of C and the possibility of B conjoin in D, 
therefore it is possible that some C is B, which contradicts the original proposition.
[303.apu] The meaning of the general conditioned proposition is that it is impossible to 
conjoin the descriptions C and B in a single substance — this entails the truth of the 
converse mentioned. [This can be also proved] by the proof given for the necessity 
proposition.
POSSIBILITY A- AND I-CONVERSION
80. [Kātibī, 312.10‒apu] The status of the two possibility propositions with respect to 
conversion or its failure is unknown due to the fact that the demonstration mentioned 
to prove their conversion depends on the conversion of the negative necessity 
proposition as itself, and on the productivity of a possibility minor with a necessity 
major in the 'rst 'gure, and neither of these can be veri'ed. This in turn is due to lack 
of success in 'nding a proof which compels acceptance or rejection of the conversion of 
the possibility proposition.
[Ḥillī, 312.pu] Our predecessors held that the two possibility propositions convert as a 
general possibility proposition, and they sought to prove this conversion with two 
arguments. [313]
[313.1] First, were the converse false, its contradictory (the necessity e-proposition) would 
be true, which converts as itself, whereupon it follows that two contradictories are true, 
which is impossible. For example, if “every (or some) C is B” by one of the two possibilities, 
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then “some B is possibly C” is true as a general possibility, otherwise “no B is possibly C”, 
which converts to “no C is possibly B”, which contradicts the original i-proposition and is 
incompatible (yuḍādd) with the a-proposition.
[313.7] Second, were the contradictory of the converse true (that is, “no B is possibly C”), we
make it the major and the original proposition (“every (or some) C is possibly B” in either of
the two possibilities) the minor, which produces in the 'rst 'gure “some C is not possibly 
C” or “no C is possibly C”; this is impossible.
[313.11] Since the author has shown (bayyana) that the necessity proposition does not 
convert as itself, he has — in his opinion — refuted the 'rst argument. And since — in his 
opinion — the possibility minor cannot be used in the 'rst 'gure (as will be explained 
presently), he has refuted the second argument. And since no other proof for the 
conversion of the possibility proposition has become apparent to him (lam yaẓhar lahu), 
then undoubtedly he should suspend judgment as to its convertibility or otherwise.
ON SYLLOGISMS
98. [Kātibī, 355.16] The condition for the 'rst 'gure with regards to its modality is that 
the minor premise be actual.
[Ḥillī, 356.5] The Ancients (al-qudamāʾ) claimed to produce a necessity conclusion from a 
possibility minor with a necessity major. On the hypothesis that the possible occurs (ʿalā 
taqdīri wuqūʿi l-mumkin) the conclusion would be necessary, and thus it is necessary in the 
way things are in themselves (fī nafsi l-amr); otherwise the possible entails the impossible 
(namely, what is not necessary being necessary on the assumption of the possible).
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[356.9] [And the Ancients also claimed] that from a possibility minor and a possibility major
a one-sided possibility conclusion [is produced]. [This is because] on the hypothesis that 
the possible occurs, the possibility [conclusion] is true; so it is that the possibility 
[conclusion] is true according to the way things are in themselves. Otherwise what is not 
possible according to the way things are in themselves is possible on the hypothesis that 
the possible occurs, and this is absurd.
[356.12] Similarly if the major is an existential and the minor a possibility. If it is a two-
sided possibility, then, with one of its two parts, the minor forms a syllogism which 
produces a one-sided possibility, and with its other part, a syllogism producing a one-sided 
possibility conclusion di(ering [in quality] from the 'rst — so the conclusion will be two-
sided.
[356.15] The later scholars rejected the truth of the major on the the hypothesis that the 
[possible] minor occurs.43 This is an error [which they should reject], otherwise they are 
mired in what they seek to *ee. For were the necessity or possibility majors false on the 
hypothesis that the possible [predicate in the possibility minor] occurs, then the possible 
would entail the impossible, because the falsity of the necessary or the possible is 
impossible in itself. (It is however possible for the existential to be false, because the 
judgment may follow the description rather than the essence of the middle, and it is 
unknown whether [the description] applies to the minor term; so here rebutting the truth 
as to its actual application is possible for these propositions.) But the possible [must follow],
for the possible is implied (lāzima) in any case. [357]
43. E.g. Khūnajī; see Kashf 272.4 et seq., at 271.10 et seq.
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[357.1] According to the doctrine of the Ancients (al-qudamāʾ), the productive connexions in
this 'gure are 169 moods, coming about from 13 squared. According to the doctrine of the 
author, 26 of these are dropped, the result of 13 times 2 possibility propositions.
‒41‒
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